

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

[REDACTED]

04 AUG 1978

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]

Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT: Status of Civilian Space Policy Review

1. Action Requested: None. For your information only.

2. Background:

a. The President asked Dr. Frank Press, the President's Science Advisor, to convene the NSC Space Policy Review Committee (SPRC), established recently under NSC/PD-37, to prepare by 1 September an interagency space policy option paper (see Attachment 1). A meeting of the SPRC to discuss the President's instructions and resolve the issues that would set the dimensions of the review was held on 21 June (see Attachment 2). Since I was out of town, [REDACTED] attended as your representative along with Hans Mark.

b. The policy options have been addressed by seven inter-agency task forces (see Attachment 3). We are represented on three of these task forces. The schedule (Attachment 4) called for draft Task Force reports by 20 July and a draft Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) space policy options paper by 31 July. The draft task force reports have been submitted but the OSTP draft paper is about one week late and is expected by about 4 August.

3. Discussion: Short summaries of the draft Task Force reports are attached (Annex A). Pertinent comments on items of special interest to you follow below.

a. On Task Force I, the space shuttle, I am your representative and Dr. Hans Mark is the Defense representative. The President, as you know, expressed concern in the OMB Spring Budget Reviews about the adequacy of the scope and timing of the shuttle transition planning. Action to respond directly on this issue was given to

[REDACTED]

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

Secretary of Defense Brown and in turn to Hans Mark. Because of this ongoing action, the Task Force has thus far attempted to avoid detailed consideration of this issue and has instead focused on other issues such as operations management, survivability, and provision for additional capability. However, the President also requested that the SPRC review this issue and there has been pressure from Frank Press to include it to a greater extent than in the first draft Task Force report.

b. Task Force III, remote sensing, addressed the concept of an integrated National earth observation space program to sense the atmosphere, land, and ocean on an operational basis. As conceived by the Task Force, the program ultimately would meet both the defense and civil sector needs. While the program would exclude space intelligence assets, it is envisioned that data output from satellite reconnaissance selectively would be made available to the proposed National Earth Observation Space Program consistent with the limitations of national security restrictions as defined by the DCI. With declassification of the "fact of", increased use of intelligence imagery in the civil sector can be anticipated. Questions concerning sector overlap relative to the foreign release of data, the resolution limits (if any), and intelligence needs for Landsat multispectral imagery also need to be addressed before accepting the Task Force's recommendation to approve in principle the concept of an integrated National Earth Observation Space Program.

c. Task Force VI, Intersector Overlap, has been cut back in scope from Frank Press's original issue formulation. The conclusions thus far give qualified support to the status quo and no recommendations for change are made. Press may change this Task Force report to include options for increased intersector technology and data sharing. Task Force VI is also addressing the "fact of" issue which you have discussed with Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance and which you and I subsequently discussed. The Task Force Report on this subject assumes a decision to declassify the "fact of" and focuses on planning for implementation. As you know, this step is widely opposed throughout the Intelligence Community because of risks relative to intelligence security and to U.S. foreign and domestic policy. We are planning to continue to evaluate both risks and benefits in connection with the further refinement of the implementation plan.

d. Following interagency staff level comment, a redraft of the OSTP draft paper will be circulated in late August and an SPRC meeting to seek further consensus will be scheduled for about 1 September.

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

We have established an Intelligence Community working group to aid coordination on the issues (Attachment 5). I will keep you fully informed on significant developments in this area.



25X1

Attachments

- 1 - 13 June memo fm Dr. Press
RE: Civilian Space Policy
- 2 - 27 June memo fm Ms. Dodson
RE: Policy Review Committee
Meeting on Space
- 3 - List of Space Policy Task
Forces (6/27/78)
- 4 - Schedule for Space Policy
- 5 - List of IC Working Group Members

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TASK FORCE I
STRATEGY TO UTILIZE THE SHUTTLE CAPABILITY

CHAIRMAN: NASA - John Yardley

MEMBERS: NASA, Defense, DCI, Commerce, Interior, State

DCI REP.: (D/DCI/RM), Alternate -
(IC Staff)

ISSUE STATEMENT:

What should be the U.S. strategy to effectively utilize the Shuttle by all space sectors, including the better flow of technology between sectors?

Possible options and questions that need to be examined include whether to gradually reduce reliance on expendable launch vehicles as currently planned or increase earlier reliance on Shuttle capability with the first successful test, so as to reduce the redundancy requirement. Likewise, the space-related capabilities required to effectively utilize the Shuttle for specific national needs (currently projected) will have to be examined; e.g., increased orbital staytime, increased maneuverability, or other new space capabilities. The issues on utilizing the Shuttle and on technology overlap between civil, military, and national intelligence programs (Task Force VI) have many similarities. The task forces responsible for developing options on these two issues will work closely, and consideration on whether to combine these efforts will be made after each is developed independently.

CURRENT SUBISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES:

Issue: When and how should the operational responsibilities of the DOD and NASA change vis-a-vis the two sectors as use of the STS approaches and is initiated? Should the current plan for joint use of the JSC Mission Control Center (MCC) as delineated in the NASA/DOD Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Management and Operation of the STS continue or do the respective sector responsibilities require separate operational entities?

Options:

- A. Continue current plan until adequate learning and maturity is achieved and then establish a separate DOD MCC, if required, based on accumulated experience.
- B. Decide now that the risks to security will outweigh the benefits of experience thereby establishing a separate DOD MCC as soon as possible to meet critical DOD STS missions.

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

Issue: At what level and pace of activity should provisions for survivability be implemented for the Space Transportation System and its supporting resources?

Options:

A. Limit STS survivability provisions to existing maneuverability and to encryption of command and data links to, from and between space segments.

B. Provide for limited engineering changes and special operational procedures to improve survivability of flight systems--for example, addition of warning sensors, development of extended evasive maneuvering capability, greater protection of avionics equipment, and autonomous operation. Develop contingency plans for dedicated military use of the STS.

C. In addition to provisions of Option B, provide for eventual selected major modifications to flight systems--for example, total vehicle hardening, a new concept thermal protection system, or greatly increased ΔV capability. Develop alternate operational capabilities for critical resources--for example, propellant manufacturing or external tank transport.

Issue: How, when, and in what areas is it in the best interests of the government to build on the presently defined capabilities of the STS through system augmentation and/or developments?

Options:

A. Recognized deficiencies or imbalances in capability which occur during the development cycle should be studied, identified, evaluated by the collective system "users" and introduced into existing development decision-making systems.

B. In addition to overcoming recognized deficiencies or imbalances (Option A), studies should be directed to new system elements to enhance the range of capabilities available to the users of space.

C. Recognizing the 7- to 10-year development cycle for large space systems, we should, in addition to those activities covered in Options A and B, now undertake a major study of the follow-on systems which will serve the nation's space capability needs in and beyond the 1990's.

Issue to be added*: Should early reliance on the Shuttle capability be increased with the first successful test, so as to reduce the redundancy requirement for expendable launch vehicles?

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

None.

*Transition plans are described in the text and are justified as reasonable and necessary to maintain a high confidence of assured launch capability. Higher risk

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TASK FORCE III
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ROLE IN REMOTE SENSING

CHAIRMAN: NASA - Anthony Calio

MEMBERS: NASA, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, State, AID, Defense,
DCI

DCI REP.: [] (Collection Tasking Staff), Alternate -
[] (IC Staff/COMIREX)

ISSUE STATEMENT*:

What are the organizational questions that need to be addressed to further exploit civil remote sensing capabilities?

Possible options and questions that need to be addressed include: whether to continue present arrangement with NASA sustaining lead agency responsibility for civil remote sensing R&D with the user agencies responsible for data processing and distribution; whether to establish a Federal Survey Administration, for example, that would operate aggregate remote sensing requirements across the board; or whether and how to encourage user agencies to operate and determine what technologies and systems should be advanced to meet their individual requirements. Of course, the budget and possible financing arrangements of these various approaches must be addressed.

How should the U.S. proceed with remote sensing capabilities developed under LANDSAT and other remote sensing activities?

Possible approaches would include: to continue experimentation in a limited R&D environment with a commitment to continuity of data services at least through 1985; or to declare the undertaking of a full-scale operational demonstration program for a period of 10 years with a decision on operational status by 1985. Specifically, the various modes of transition of LANDSAT from R&D to operational status need to be examined. Likewise, how to respond to initiatives of the U.S. private sector for involvement in remote sensing needs to be evaluated and various alternatives considered.

CURRENT SUBISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES:

The Task Force recast the original issue statements as follows:

Issue: What should be the U.S. position on space remote sensing?

*Memo, Frank Press to Multiple Addressees, Civilian Space Policy, 13 June 1978 (Attachment 1).

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

Options:

A. Maintain present funding levels and objectives for current operational environmental satellite systems and for on-going remote sensing research and development programs.

B. Add-on: NOSS. To the present operational and R&D programs, add the National Oceanic Satellite System (NOSS) as an operational demonstration.

C. Add-on: Landsat (operational capability). To the present operational systems and R&D programs add land observation operational capability based on a Landsat D or -D' technical capability.

D. Add-on: Both NOSS and an operational Landsat. To the present operational systems and R&D programs add both the National Oceanic Satellite System and an operational Landsat system.

NOTE: Analysis of issues such as the operating agency, the role of the private sector, and international arrangements was deferred for further study.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Task Force believes that the opportunity is now at hand to integrate sensors, platforms, orbits, and data streams in a way that permits great gains in efficiency and economy of remote sensing from space. It is recommended that the President approve in principle the nation moving to an integrated national system for observing the atmosphere, land and oceans from space and direct that the conceptual design, detailed steps and phasing, management approach and operating entity be developed by August 1979 for review by the Space PRC and forwarding to the President in time for decisions on the FY 1981 budget.

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TASK FORCE VI
EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY OVERLAP BETWEEN
CIVIL, MILITARY, AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SPACE PROGRAM

CHAIRMAN: Defense - Adm. Dan Murphy

MEMBERS: Defense, NASA, State, DCI, Commerce, ACDA

DCI REP.: (IC Staff)

ISSUE STATEMENT*:

What steps should be taken to improve data and technology sharing between the civil, military, and national intelligence space programs?

This issue was originally framed to address a much broader question, "Should the U.S. continue to maintain the separation between civil, military, and intelligence programs?" At the 21 June SPRC meeting, we pointed out and there was general agreement that institutionally, the separation between civil, military, and national intelligence programs had been thoroughly examined in PRM-11, in E.O. 12036, in PRM-23, and the ensuing PD-37. It was agreed, therefore, that this issue would be recast along the lines identifying areas where data, equipment, and technology sharing should take place. This would avoid undue duplication and overlap--assuring that if one agency can or is doing a function better than another, both would not carry out the function.

On 7 July, Dr. Brzezinski requested that Task Force VI analyze the implications of maintaining the classified status of the "fact of" reconnaissance from space.

The thrust of the effort should be to focus on the following issue: Is a change in current policy beyond NSC/PD-37 concerning utilization of information derived from remote sensing systems in the ultimate national interest? If so, to what extent and in what manner should such a change be made, beginning with the acknowledgement of the "fact of" reconnaissance? Determine whether the benefits to be derived in defense of our foreign and defense policies sufficiently outweigh the potential risks. Assure that a change will not constitute an ultimate threat to national security. The analysis should address the needs for a careful implementation plan to assure that potentially negative impacts of such action are solved. Some specific issues include: consultation with Congress, Allies, and the Soviets; international legal considerations; and security plan to assure that public government exposure does not result in a breakdown of existing security systems.

*Based on: (1) Summary of Conclusions of 21 June 1978 SPRC Meeting,
(2) 7 July OSTP Memo, A. Morrissey to

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

CURRENT SUBISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES:

None.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Conclusions on Technology Overlap Issue: It is clear there is interaction among the sectors. In addition to formal management structures for coordination and review, there are other powerful forces that act to minimize duplication and foster intersector transfers of products and capabilities. Indeed, many of the technological security issues center on controlling this interface in response to industry pressures. A major forcing function is the chronic shortage of resources.

The government review process--OMB, Congress, and the GAO--perform some cross-cut association of programs, technologies, and resources. In fact, much intersector coordination has been caused by these agencies, including the use of intelligence imagery for civil mapping coordinated weather satellite development and procurement, and consolidation of radionavigation systems. Nonetheless, none of these review elements have performed an efficient or effective cross-cut on a continuing basis.

Despite the success in intersector coordination and cooperation over the years, one single characteristic stands out. While Federal civil programs are scrutinized in detail for military or intelligence interactions, the reverse has not been true. Improved two-way flow in this area is largely a matter of policy direction from above, supported by security guidelines that allow access to information without increasing risks of compromise. Such guidelines can focus on the interaction among top program managers within the sectors, without exacerbating the existing problems of "cleared" versus "not cleared" personnel.

Another opportunity lies in the direction of overt joint program and project activities among the sectors, particularly in the area of civil support to military activities.

Because of time constraints, it was not possible to review specific technologies nor examine program details. Nor was it possible to prepare budget data in a way that showed the space program in an internally consistent accounting system (departments allocate launch costs differently). These steps are candidates for follow-on work.

Conclusions on the "Fact of" Issue: This very compressed review suggests the following:

1. Under appropriate circumstances and with stringent advance preparation, the "fact of" can be declassified with real but not unacceptable risks to intelligence security and to U.S. foreign and domestic policy.

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2. The benefits of declassifying the "fact of" alone are limited: there is an obvious, commonsense value to the forthright admission of what is widely known; there are some short-lived public information values; and there may be some improvement in the credibility in the eyes of the U.S. public of SALT verification.
3. If a decision is reached to go beyond declassification of the "fact of" and to additionally include a selective and phased public release of substantive imagery, both risks and benefits increase; it is believed that the risks, while far from negligible, could be adequately controlled and that the potential longer term benefits of a policy revision warrant a careful assessment of this possibility before acceptance or rejection.
4. It is imperative that full and detailed execution and contingency plans be developed and assessed well in advance of overt policy change or official public statement on this matter.

Recommendations on the "Fact Of" Issue: Given that the initial assessments outlined above appear reasonable, it is clear that further work on analyzing the concept of a space intelligence security policy change is in order. This effort should fall into four phases:

1. An intensive analysis of the points and possibilities noted in this paper by a few key individuals selected from the Departments of Defense and State, the intelligence community, and the Executive Office of the President under the direction of a senior NSC member. This could be accomplished within 4 to 6 weeks; with an additional 2-week period for official agency comment.
2. Presidential review and decision on desirability of change and appropriate scope thereof in 3 weeks.
3. Detailed development and setting in place of the implementation elements--consultation strategies, security planning, contingency plans--by the responsible agencies over a period of at least 12 to 16 weeks.
4. Execution after final Presidential review and approval.

TOP SECRET

Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

Schedule for Space Policy

<u>DATE</u>		<u>SUBJECT</u>
June 21	--	Review President's instructions, determine any additional issues to be raised, and make task force assignments.
June 23	--	Agencies to submit names of task force chairmen and cochairmen to OSTP.
July 20	--	Task force drafts of space policy options due to OSTP indicating the interrelationship of policy issues.
August 4	--	Agency comments due to OSTP.
August 14	--	OSTP will circulate space policy options paper in preparation for Space Policy Review Committee meeting.
August 28	--	Consider space policy options paper at a Space Policy Review Committee meeting and seek further consensus.
September 1	--	Submit space options paper to President.

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010037-6

CONFIDENTIAL

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt